This repository has been archived by the owner on Jul 17, 2020. It is now read-only.
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 2
/
ch11-2.html
296 lines (259 loc) · 13.9 KB
/
ch11-2.html
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch11-2</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>Proposal for a Lunar Orbit Mission</h2>
<p>
Almost as soon as NASA adopted an alphabetical stairway for reaching the
moon in progressive flights (see <a href = "ch9-5.html">Chapter
9</a>), with the seventh, or G, step representing the ultimate goal,
mission planners had begun looking for ways to omit a letter. In late
1967, when the ABC-scheme evolved, Low and Flight Operations Director
Christopher Kraft had pushed for a lunar-orbital mission as soon as
possible to learn more about communications, navigation, and thermal
control in the deep space environment.<p>
In the spring of 1968, Apollo officials in Houston were trying to
upgrade the E mission (operating the command module and the lander in
high-earth orbit) into something called E-prime, which would move the
mission to the vicinity of the moon. But by August Gilruth and others
had concluded that LM-3 would not be ready for flight that year. This
finding left NASA with two excellent command modules, 101 and 103, but
no lunar module companions. Low had already recognized this likelihood
in July, after Kennedy found the many deficiencies in LM-3. If a lunar
module could not be manned in 1968, he reasoned that Saturn V 503 and
CSM-103 might be used for a circumlunar or lunar-orbit flight. Low kept
his own counsel for a while, waiting for the Saturn V pogo problem to be
resolved.<p>
On 7 August, Low asked Kraft to work out a flight plan for such a
mission during 1968. Then the Houston manager, accompanied by Carroll
Bolender, Scott Simpkinson, and Owen Morris, went to the Cape on 8
August to talk with Phillips, Kennedy Director Kurt Debus, Petrone, and
Roderick Middleton about the status of Saturn V 503. The Cape contingent
believed it could launch the big Saturn in January 1969.<a href =
"#source5"><b>5</b></a><p>
Back in Houston the next day, 9 August, MSC Director Gilruth had hardly
entered his office before Low began telling him his ideas for a
lunar-orbit mission. Gilruth, too, was enthusiastic, and he and Low
started calling Washington, Huntsville, and the Cape to set up a meeting
that same afternoon at Marshall. Low next talked to Kraft, who said the
mission was feasible from a ground control and spacecraft computer
standpoint. Gilruth, Low, Kraft, and Flight Crew Operations Director
Donald Slayton then boarded a plane for Huntsville. At 2:30, they were
joined by Debus and Petrone from Kennedy and Phillips and George Hage
from Headquarters. Making an even dozen were the Marshall hosts, Wernher
von Braun, Eberhard Rees, Ludie G. Richard, and Lee James.<p>
Low said that a lunar-orbit mission, if it could be flown in December,
might be the only way to meet the fast-approaching lunar landing
deadline. This remark sparked a lively discussion. The talk was mostly
about what each of the NASA elements would have to do to make the
mission possible in the time remaining. Debus and Petrone considered
Kennedy's workload and concluded that they could be ready by 1 December;
von Braun, Rees, James, and Richard reported that they had nearly solved
the pogo problem; and Low and Gilruth talked about the differences
between command modules 103 and 106 (the first spacecraft originally
scheduled to go to the moon) and what to use as a substitute for the
lander.<p>
Even as he joined in the discussion, Apollo Program Director Phillips
had been taking notes. He said they should keep their plans secret until
a decision was made by NASA's top officials. In the meantime, while
gathering whatever information was needed, they would use the code name
"Sam's Budget Exercise" as a cover. The conferees would meet
in Washington on 14 August - "Decision Day." Administrator
James Webb and Mueller would be in Vienna attending the United Nations
Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at that
time. If the Washington meeting decided in favor of the lunar-orbit
mission, Phillips would fly to Austria to sell the idea to Webb and
Mueller.<a href = "#source6"><b>6</b></a><p>
In Houston at 8:30 that evening, Low met with spacecraft chiefs Kenneth
Kleinknecht and Bolender, technical assistant George Abbey, and North
American Apollo manager Dale Myers. Kleinknecht began studying the
differences between spacecraft 103 and 106, Bolender left for Bethpage
to find a substitute for LM-3, and Myers went back to Downey to make
sure that command module 103 was moving along and to oversee any changes
Kleinknecht recommended. Joseph Kotanchik, structures expert in Houston,
could not see any reason for Bolender's trip to Bethpage; a simple
cross-beam could be used for weight and balance, he said. But Kotanchik
found himself alone in this position. The others believed that a true
facsimile should be carried, and Low decided on a lunar test article.<p>
Early on Monday morning, 12 August, Kraft told Low that the target date
would have to be 20 December if they wanted to launch in daylight. If
the flight had to be terminated for any reason shortly after launch,
good visibility was necessary for recovering the spacecraft. In the
meantime, Slayton had been thinking about which crew to pick for the
flight. Frank Borman's team had been training for a high-altitude
mission. Slayton talked with Borman over the weekend and decided to
propose that crew at the meeting in Washington.<a href =
"#source7"><b>7</b></a><p>
The 12 men who had gathered in Huntsville were joined by William
Schneider and Julian H. Bowman when they met with Deputy Administrator
Thomas O. Paine<a href = "#explanation1"><b>*</b></a> at Headquarters on
Wednesday, 14 August. Low reviewed spacecraft status, Kraft discussed
flight operations, and Slayton talked about flight crew preparations.
Von Braun reported that the Saturn would be ready for the launch, and he
and Rees agreed that Low had made a good selection of a stand-in for the
lunar module. Debus and Petrone said the Cape could launch the Saturn V
by 6 December.<a href = "#source8"><b>8</b></a><p>
After listening to the plotters, Paine decided to play devil's advocate.
Not too long ago, he said, you people were trying to decide whether it
was safe to man the third Saturn V (503), and now you want to put men on
top of it and send them to the moon. The Deputy Administrator then asked
for comments. This is what he heard:
<p>
<em>Von Braun:</em> Once you decided to man 503, it did not matter how
far you went.
<p>
<em>Hage:</em> There are a number of places in the mission where
decisions can be made and risks minimized.
<p>
<em>Slayton:</em> It is the only chance to get to the moon before the
end of 1969.
<p>
<em>Debus:</em> I have no technical reservations.
<p>
<em>Petrone:</em> I have no reservations.
<p>
<em>Bowman:</em> It will be a shot in the arm for manned space
flight.
<p>
<em>James:</em> Manned safety in this and following flights will be
enhanced.
<p>
<em>Richard:</em> Our lunar capability will be advanced by flying this
mission.
<p>
<em>Schneider:</em> The plan has my wholehearted endorsement.
<p>
<em>Gilruth:</em> Although this may not be the only way to meet our
goal, it does increase the possibility. There is always risk, but this
is a path of less risk. In fact, the minimum risk of all Apollo plans.
<p>
<em>Kraft:</em> Flight Operations will have a difficult job here. We
need all kinds of priorities - it will not be easy to do, but I have
confidence. But it should be a lunar orbit and not a circumlunar flight.
<p>
<em>Low:</em> Assuming Apollo 7 is a success, there is no other
choice.<a href = "#source9"><b>9</b></a><p>
So ended the round table vote, by the men who managed the day-to-day
details of the Apollo program, to commit the first crew to fly to the
moon. Paine was impressed, but he was only the first of the three top
men who had to be convinced. Webb and Mueller would not be so easy to
sell. In fact, when Mueller called Phillips from Vienna during the
meeting and learned of the plan, he was not receptive. He urged Phillips
not to come to Vienna. By the next day, 15 August, he had warmed to the
idea, but he wanted Phillips to keep it quiet until after Apollo 7. Webb
was shocked by the audacity of the proposal and was inclined to say no
immediately. After talking with Phillips and Paine, however, he asked
for more information.<p>
Paine called Willis H. Shapley, Julian Scheer, and Phillips in to draft
a text for Webb. Paine's cable to Vienna on 15 August underlined his
complete support and included an item-by-item schedule of necessary
actions. The cable also contained a draft of a statement for Webb to
make in Vienna and a draft of a press release to be issued in
Washington. Altogether, the cablegram covered seven typewritten pages.<a
href = "#source10"><b>10</b></a><p>
After discussing the proposal with Mueller, Webb cabled Paine on 16
August that he believed it unwise for any announcement to originate from
Vienna. Webb told his deputy to plan for the lunar-orbit flight but to
make no public statement about it. In other words, NASA could not talk
about anything but an earth-orbital mission. Webb also asked Paine to
notify the White House and the President's scientific advisers about any
drastic changes in mission planning. This was not what the planners had
asked for, but it was certainly more than Webb had given them the
previous day. Now they had to figure out how to stay within the
constraints set by the Administrator and still get everything ready for
a lunar-orbit mission if approval came later. Phillips called Low,
saying he would be in Houston the next day to decide how to handle the
situation.<a href = "#source11"><b>11</b></a><p>
Phillips and Hage arrived in Houston on 17 August and met with Gilruth,
Low, Kraft, and Slayton. The Apollo program leader from Washington said
that Webb had given him clear authority to prepare for a 6 December
launch, to designate it as a C-prime mission, and to call it Apollo 8.
He then ticked off what else had been authorized: they could assign
Borman's crew to the flight, equip and train it to meet the 6 December
launch, and speak of the flight as earth-orbital while continuing to
plan for a lunar orbit. The plotters were well aware, and Phillips
reemphasized it, that a successful command module qualification flight
in earth orbit by Apollo 7 was the key to the first lunar flight's being
approved for 1968.<a href = "#source12"><b>12</b></a> Now Houston had to
train crews to fly that mission, as well as the others that would
follow.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1"><b>*</b></a> After being first Associate and
then Deputy Administrator of NASA for more than seven years, Robert
Seamans (who originally intended to stay only two years) resigned on 2
October 1967 and left the agency on 5 January 1968. On 31 January,
President Lyndon Johnson announced the nomination of Paine, a General
Electric official, to replace Seamans. Paine was confirmed by the Senate
on 5 February and sworn into office on 25 March.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source5"><b>5</b>.</a> Low to Owen E. Maynard, "Apollo
Flight Test Program," 21 May 1968, with enc.; Harold E. Granger to
Tech. Asst., ASPO, "E′ Mission," 7 June 1968; Jones W. Roach
to Actg. Chief, Flight Control Div. (FCD), "Manpower Impact of
Simultaneous E and E′ Mission Planning," 21 June 1968; Milton E.
Windler to Actg. Chief, FCD, "Impact on FCD of adding an E lunar
orbital mission planning effort," n.d., with encs.; Rodney G. Rose
memo, "Mission E Prime Task Force Report," 12 July 1968, with
enc.; Low to Dir., NASA Hist. Off., "Comments on History of NACA
and NASA - Continued," 29 Sept. 1975, with encs., "Special
Notes for August 9, 1968, and Subsequent," pp. 1-2, and
"Special Notes for November 10 and 11, 1968"; Jay Holmes,
telephone interview, 10 Jan. 1969; Gilruth to Mueller, 1 May 1968, with
enc.; LM-3 Delta DCR, 7 Aug. 1968; Low memo for record, "Report of
meeting at KSC," 10 Aug. 1968.<p>
<a name = "source6"><b>6</b>.</a> Low, "Special Notes for August
9," pp. 2-4; MSFC meeting for Gilruth, 9 Aug. 1968, with enc.;
<cite>Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968: Chronology On Science,
Technology, and Policy,</cite> NASA SP-4010 Washington, 1969, pp.
189-90.<p>
<a name = "source7"><b>7</b>.</a> Low, "Special Notes for August
9," pp. 4-6; Joseph N. Kotanchik to Dir., Engineering and
Development, and Mgr., ASPO, "Use of a LM, LTA-B or other unit in
SLA of AS-503," 26 Aug. 1968; Low to Kotanchik, "Use of LTA-B
fr AS-503," 27 Aug. 1968.<p>
<a name = "source8"><b>8</b>.</a> Low, "Special Notes for August
9," pp. 6-7; minutes of Meeting to Review Technical Feasibility of
AS-503 CSM Only Mission, Washington D.C., 14th Aug 1968;
<cite>Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967: Chronology on Science,
Technology, and Policy,</cite> NASA SP-4008 (Washington, 1968), p. 288;
<cite>Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968,</cite> pp. 26, 32, 68.<p>
<a name = "source9"><b>9</b>.</a> Low, "Special Notes for August
9," pp. 7-9.<p>
<a name = "source10"><b>10</b>.</a> Ibid., pp. 7, 9-10; Thomas O. Paine,
NASA Deputy Admin., cablegram to James E. Webb, Admin., 15 Aug. 1968.<p>
<a name = "source11"><b>11</b>.</a> Webb telegram to Paine, 16 Aug.
1968; Low, "Special Notes for August 9," p. 10.<p>
<a name = "source12"><b>12</b>.</a> MSC, minutes of meeting on C Prime
Mission Guidelines, 17 Aug. 1968; "Gen. Phillips Notes on C Prime
Mission Guidelines, 17 August 1968"; "Mr. [George H.] Hage's
Notes from C Prime Mission Mt'g @ MSC, 17 August 1968: Actions Required
to Go to Moon"; Low, "Special Notes for August 9," pp.
10-12.
<P>
<HR>
<P>
<CENTER><A HREF="ch11-1.html">
<IMG SRC="previous.gif" ALIGN="left"
ALT="Previous Page">
</A>
<A HREF="ch11-3.html">
<IMG SRC="next.gif" ALIGN="right"
ALT="Next Page">
</A>
<A HREF="contents.html">
<IMG SRC="index.gif" ALIGN="middle"
ALT="Table of Contents"></A>
</CENTER><BR>
<HR>
<P>
</BODY>
<!--ADA TEAM 2001-->
</HTML>