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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
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<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch10-4</title>
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<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>The LM: Some Questions, Some Answers</h2>
<p>
Following <cite>Apollo 5,</cite> it appeared likely that one of the six
flights planned for 1968 might be canceled. Fewer flights should mean a
better chance of landing a crew on the moon within the decade. After
reading a preliminary version of the mission report, Phillips wired the
three manned space flight centers not to plan a second unmanned lunar
module mission. Shipment of LM-2 and its Saturn IB booster to the Cape
was delayed, pending an assessment by George Mueller's Certification
Board. On 6 and 7 March, the board agreed there was no reason for
another unmanned lunar module flight. The first lunar module to carry
men would be launched by a Saturn V later in 1968.<a href =
"#source21"><b>21</b></a><p>
The lander still had hurdles to clear, however, before anyone would be
allowed to ride it in space. Ascent engine instability, for example, had
been a matter of concern from August 1967 to June 1968. When Mueller and
Phillips visited the builder of the engine in the summer of 1967, they
agreed that Bell had a good chance of solving fuel-injector problems and
getting a stable engine ready for the first manned lander. Nevertheless,
NASA had hired Rocketdyne to develop an alternate injector, sending
Cecil R. Gibson from the Houston center to work with Bill Wilson at
Rocketdyne. This contract lasted for about a year, and Gibson and Wilson
successfully stayed on schedule, held down costs, and got the job
done.<a href = "#source22"><b>22</b></a><p>
One question that arose was whether a new and improved injector should
be flown in a manned lander without a thorough revalidation test
program. Joseph G. Thibodaux (Gibson's boss and chief of the Propulsion
and Power Division in Houston, who had been asked to head a team to
evaluate the injector) believed that it would be safe, so long as fuel
did not enter the firing chamber before oxidizer. An Agena engine that
had allowed the fuel to go first in the Gemini program had exploded
during 1965.<a href = "#source23"><b>23</b></a><p>
Grumman and NASA officials met on 29 April to discuss the status of the
injector. They were not happy with what they had discovered during
visits to the subcontractor plants. Bell had been lax in configuration
control, and Rocketdyne was having trouble getting engines to start and
then to run smoothly. For some time, NASA Headquarters had considered
asking Rocketdyne and Bell, even though they were competitors, to pool
their knowledge to get the best possible injector. Rocketdyne might send
its injector and some of its personnel to the Bell test cell for
checkout. Although hesitant at first, because this might slow down
Bell's work, Houston told Grumman to coordinate this combined testing,
calling on specialists from both subcontractors for help.<a href =
"#source24"><b>24</b></a><p>
As time passed, Phillips and Low began to worry more and more about what
would happen if the Rocketdyne injector were picked. How much testing
would have to be done to make certain that a Rocketdyne engine was safe
enough for a crew to fly on LM-3? And how long would it take?<a href =
"#source25"><b>25</b></a><p>
Numerous trips were made to Bell by NASA officials, trying to get a grip
on the problem. In May, after one visit, Low wrote: "If stability
were the only criterion for acceptance, then a decision to select the
Rocketdyne engine would have been clear. However, the Rocketdyne engine
has also some short-comings, which are not yet completely
understood." Low also believed that, if Rocketdyne were picked, it
would take some "extraordinary efforts to integrate the new engine
into the LM." That same month, a group led by Phillips of NASA and
Joseph Gavin of Grumman met to discuss the alternatives they faced: (1)
to use the Bell engine and Bell injector, (2) to ship Bell engines to
Rocketdyne for fitting with Rocketdyne injectors, or (3) to send
Rocketdyne injectors to Bell for installation in the Bell engine. Low
finally decided to use a Bell engine and a Rocketdyne injector, with the
entire assembly being put together and furnished by Rocketdyne.<a href =
"#source26"><b>26</b></a><p>
At 17 and 19 June program reviews at Rocketdyne and Bell, respectively,
Low learned that qualification tests were progressing with such
excellent results (the engine had gone through 53 good tests) that an
end to qualification by mid-August seemed possible.<a href =
"#source27"><b>27</b></a> Success now appeared certain, but the race
with the decade was becoming very close.<p>
Although the ascent engine was the most serious lander problem, there
were others that created worries. For example, a window blew out of LM-5
during a test. On another occasion, a window fractured during a 72-hour
high-temperature test. Corning Glass Works immediately began improving
the panes, producing what Mueller called the strongest windows ever put
in a spacecraft. And Grumman instigated a series of pressure tests to
qualify the new windows.<a href = "#source28"><b>28</b></a> All this
took time.<p>
Still another area that raised a red flag of concern was the discovery
of stress corrosion cracks in the lander's aluminum structural members.
This meant replacements and still more lost time, which angered George
Mueller. He reminded Gilruth that these aluminum tubes (made of an alloy
called "7075 T6") had caused problems in the past. Mueller
could not understand why the cracks had not been noticed earlier. He
wanted a "stress corrosion team" to find out why detection had
failed and to figure out how to prevent a recurrence. Gilruth replied
that there was no need for a special team. Stress corrosion surveys had
been conducted in 1964, but the job simply "was not handled
properly on the last go-round." Low then asked Joseph Kotanchik, a
Houston structures expert, to investigate the overall stress corrosion
problem and to look into all equipment furnished by suppliers to the
prime contractors to make sure no problems were lurking in any of these
systems.<a href = "#source29"><b>29</b></a><p>
By mid-February 1968, Grumman had inspected six landers (LM-3 through
LM-8), examining more than 1,400 different components. Some parts were
buried so deeply in the structure that they could not be reached. When
no major cracks were found in the accessible areas, Grumman assumed that
the problem was not as bad as NASA thought. Grumman did strengthen any
parts not yet assembled by replacing the 7075 T6 tubes with 7075 T73, a
heavier alloy. By the end of the month, Mueller told Webb he was no
longer worried about stress corrosion.<a href =
"#source30"><b>30</b></a><p>
Another nagging problem in the lander was broken wiring. Brigadier
General Carroll H. Bolender, Manned Spacecraft Center's lunar module
manager, received the impression when visiting the Cape that the wiring
was in poor shape in LM-2 and not much better in LM-3. Bolender told his
resident Apollo spacecraft representative at the Grumman plant in New
York to emphasize to Grumman's engineering team the need to assist
manufacturing in the wiring of the spacecraft. Some improvement came
from this move, but not much. During an inspection of LM-3, several
broken wires were discovered, apparently caused by carelessness during
rework after testing. Toward the end of April 1968, fixtures were
installed to protect vulnerable wire bundles and technicians were
ordered to be more careful when working in the confined spacecraft
areas, easing the problem to a certain extent. But the lander's schedule
was getting tighter and tighter.<a href = "#source31"><b>31</b></a><p>
And the vehicle was steadily getting fatter. Reductions were urged, but
reducing diets in 1968 were nothing like those in 1965, when 1,100
kilograms were shaved from the lander. NASA used the incentive contract
as a lever to get Grumman moving on weight reduction, starting the
second quarter of 1968 with the goal of cutting 22 kilograms off the
ascent stage and 68 off the descent stage.<a href =
"#source32"><b>32</b></a><p>
All in all, the chances for launching a manned lunar module during 1968
seemed very slim in June of that year. And Saturn V, the launcher, was
still giving program officials some anxious moments.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source21"><b>21</b>.</a> Minutes, LM-2 Flight Requirement
Meeting, 26 Jan. 1968; Phillips TWX to MSC et al., 29 Jan. 1968; Abbey,
ASPO Staff Meeting, 29 Jan. 1968; MSC news release 68-5, 30 Jan. 1968;
Phillips TWX to MSC et al., 12 Feb. 1968; Walter A. Pennino TWX to all
NASA centers, 16 March 1968.<p>
<a name = "source22"><b>22</b>.</a> MSC news release 67-48, 2 Aug. 1967;
Phillips to Low, 16 Aug. 1967; William G. Gisel to Gilruth, 20 Nov.
1967, with enc., Gisel to Phillips, 20 Nov. 1967; Low to NASA Hq.,
Attn.: Phillips, "Ascent engine program plan," 9 Dec. 1967;
Phillips TWX to Low, 27 Dec. 1967; Quarterly Status Rept. no. 21, for
period ending 30 Sept. 1967, p. 18; Faget interview.<p>
<a name = "source23"><b>23</b>.</a> Quarterly Status Rept. no. 22, for
period ending 31 Dec. 1967, p. 28; Martin L. Raines to Mgr., ASPO,
"Trip Report - Rocketdyne January 5, 1968," 8 Jan. 1968; Brig.
Gen. Carroll H. Bolender, LM Mgr., MSC, to Mgr., ASPO, "Ascent
engine," 25 Jan. 1968; Joseph G. Thibodaux, Jr., to Dir., E&D,
MSC, "Action item from OMSF Management Council," 4 March 1968,
with enc., "Use of a New Injector in the Ascent Engine on
LM-3," nd.; Low to Phillips, 27 March 1968, with enc., [Thibodaux],
"Use of a New Injector in the Ascent Engine oil LM-3," n.d.<p>
<a name = "source24"><b>24</b>.</a> Minutes of Ascent Engine Meeting,
signed by Bolender for NASA and Joseph G. Gavin, Jr., for Grumman, 29
April 1968; Low to Bolender, "Design freeze of ascent engine,"
1 May 1968; Phillips to Low, 6 May 1968; Low to Bolender, "Bell
ascent engine," 11 May 1968; Cortright to Phillips,
"Interchange of information between Bell Aerospace and
Rocketdyne," 21 March 1968; Phillips to Cortright,
"Interchange of information between Bell Aerospace and
Rocketdyne," 2 April 1968; Bolender to Mgr., ASPO, "Ascent
engine," 27 Jan. 1968; Ralph H. Tripp TWX to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth et
al., "LM Ascent Engine Proposed Test of the Rocketdyne Engine in
the Bell Test Facility," 1 May 1968; Gavin, draft letter to MSC,
Attn.: Low, "Proposed Evaluation of Bell and Rocketdyne Injectors
for the LM Ascent Engine," n.d.; Low to Bolender, "Ascent
engine selection," 15 March 1968.<p>
<a name = "source25"><b>25</b>.</a> Bolender to Mgr., ASPO, "LM-3
APS Engine Change Out Schedule Impact," 15 March 1968; Low to
Phillips, 30 March 1968; Phillips to Low, 16 April 1968.<p>
<a name = "source26"><b>26</b>.</a> Low to H. J. McClellan, 18 May 1968;
Low memo for record, "Ascent engine injector," 31 May 1968;
MSC news release 68-41, 4 June 1968; Ertel and Newkirk, <cite>Apollo
Spacecraft Chronology,</cite> 4.<p>
<a name = "source27"><b>27</b>.</a> Mueller Report, 21 June 1968.<p>
<a name = "source28"><b>28</b>.</a> Quarterly Status Rept. no. 22, p.
29; Low to Joseph N. Kotanchik, "CSM/LM Structural Review," 21
Dec. 1967; Low TWX to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "Replacement of
Windows on LM-1," 28 Dec. 1967; RASPO/Bethpage Weekly Status
Report, 4 Jan. 1968; James J. Shannon TWX to C. William Rathke,
"Pressure Test of LM Windows," 16 Jan. 1968; Low to Bolender,
"Actions resulting from Saturday's meeting," 19 Feb. 1968;
Mueller Report, 26 Feb. 1968; Owen G. Morris to Mgrs., ASPO and LM,
"Docking window failure," 6 May 1968; Orvis E. Pigg and
Stanley P. Weiss, "Spacecraft Structural Windows," Apollo
Experience Report (AER), NASA Technical Note (TN) S-377 (JSC-07074),
review copy, July 1973.<p>
<a name = "source29"><b>29</b>.</a> Low to Edward Z. Gray, 20 Dec. 1967;
Low to Kotanchik, 21 Dec. 1967; Phillips to Assoc. Admin., OMSF,
"LM Stress Corrosion," 27 Dec. 1967; Mueller to Gilruth, 8
Jan. 1968; Low to Kotanchik, "Stress corrosion," 15 Jan. 1968;
minutes of GAEC/MSC Meeting at MSC on 17 Feb. 1968 Low to Dale D. Myers,
21 Dec. 1967; Gilruth to Mueller, 18 Jan. 1968; Low to Gray, 20 Dec.
1967, with encs., William F. Rector III to Grumman, Attn.: Robert S.
Mullaney, "Stress Corrosion," 12 Oct. 1964, and Rathke to MSC,
Attn.: Rector, "Stress Corrosion," 30 Oct. 1964.<p>
<a name = "source30"><b>30</b>.</a> Bolender to Mgr., ASPO, "Stress
Corrosion Review," 25 Jan. 1968; Shannon TWX to Grumman, Attn.:
Rathke, "LM Landing Gear Stress Corrosion Investigation," 29
Jan. 1968; Stress Corrosion Review Progress Report, 16 Feb. 1968; Low to
Bolender, 19 Feb. 1968; Mueller Report, 26 Feb. 1968; Stanley P. Weiss,
"Lunar Module Structural System," AER TN S-345 (MSC-04932),
June 1972.<p>
<a name = "source31"><b>31</b>.</a> Low to Bolender, no subj., 16 Feb.
1968; Bolender to Low, interoffice routing slip, 17 Feb. 1968; Bolender
to Mgr., ASPO, "Wiring," 28 March 1968, and "Wire problem
on LM-3," 15 April 1968.<p>
<a name = "source32"><b>32</b>.</a> J. C. Stark, interoffice memo, to
Llewellyn J. Evans (Grumman President), George F. Titterton, and R.
Hutton, "LM Weight Status Report," 29 Jan. 1968; Low to Evans,
20 March 1968; Owen E. Maynard, chm., LM Weight Reduction Task Force
Meeting, 29 March 1968; Abbey, ASPO Staff Meeting, 29 Jan. 1968;
Configuration Control Board Meeting, 5 April 1968; "LM Hardware
Weight Reductions: Initial Submittal," Grumman, 5 April 1968.
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